When the Sumdorong Chu stand-off between Indian and Chinese armies was at its peak in the autumn of 1986. The PLA suggested that both sides create a buffer zone by moving 20 kilometers from the points in Arunachal Pradesh. To avoid the possibility of an accidental flare-up. The Indian Army, under General K Sundarji, responded by asking their Chinese counterpart. The reference point of the buffer zone is the 1,126-km Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh. Undefined and Beijing claimed the Indian state as its territory. The Chinese never got back with the reply and the Sumdorong Chu stand-off. Finally resolved some eight years later with the Indian Army not budging an inch.
Cut to May 2020 transgressions along the 1597-km LAC in Ladakh. The Chinese army, under instructions from the highest levels, transgressed into the Gogra Hot Springs area near Kongka La and to Finger 4 mountainous spur on the northern banks of Pangong Tso to impose the 1959 Green Line defined by then prime minister Chou En-Lai on the Ladakh LAC. This resulted in a stand-off with the Indian Army matching the Chinese strength on the ground today with no signs of PLA disengagement at Gogra-Hot Springs and de-escalation limited to only Pangong Tso fingers and the south banks of the salty cold lake along the Rezang La-Rechin La ridgeline.
During the 11 rounds of military dialogue, the PLA again came up with the proposal of creating a buffer zone on the north banks of Pangong Tso and a 10-km no-fly zone around the LAC to ensure that there was no accidental escalation due to local friction. With deception and subterfuge as its legitimate tools, the PLA suggested Finger 4 to be the reference point rather than Finger 8, which is the Indian perception of the LAC. It is understood that the Indian side offered a via media solution by proposing a buffer zone from median finger 6 as the reference point, but the PLA never agreed.
