A report on the Rafale deal—claiming that the price established for was too high, that the government dishonored laid-down measures and guidelines, and that a chance to discuss a better price by leveraging an opposing offer from an opposing salesperson was unavoidable. The report contains some conspicuous assertions that are not borne out by the facts. What follows is a stop working of five main goof-ups.
Claim 1:
"Modi's conclusion to buy 36 Rafale's explosion the price of each jet up by 41%"
The 2007 bid price is not directly similar to the 2016 agreement due to the price inflation and swap rate dissimilarity that occurred in the nine superseding years. In order to account for these risks, the original bid controlled a growth section that progressively raised the price of the aircraft every year. If the value of the 2007 bid, on a per aircraft basis, were adjusted to 2016—the year the Rafale accord was officially signed—it would have resulted in a price of €100.85 million for each essentials airplane. This was higher than the €91.7 million that was negotiated by the government in 2016. Thus, the government's claim of a 9% reduction makes economic sense, while The Hindu's claim of 41% growth does not.
Moreover, the discussion over raw numbers neglects a vital point: that the judgment isn't really apples-to-apples. Dassault's 2007 bid was for an F3 normal Rafale. The present deal is for a more advanced variant, as well as India-specific enhancement that boosts its efficiency. Claiming a 41% price growth between the two would be corresponding to comparing the 2007 price of a Maruti Swift LDi with the 2016 price of a customized Swift ZXi, and closing that the price of the car has shot up.
Claim 2:
The F3-R Rafale possesses "virtually the same arrangement and capability" as the older F3 model . . . "Dassault claim a €1.4 billion cost for the 'design and development' of . . . additional capabilities in the form of hardware as well as software that had been particular by the Indian Air Force all along."
We know from previous reports on the topic that the additional capability went further than the Indian Air Force's rider in the MMRCA tender. "The Rafale's is being procured under the current deal has a better armaments suite such as the game-changer METEOR missiles".
Also, the F3-R normal Rafale represent a vast development over the F3. It can carry the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile (which significantly outranges the MICA missile that the F3 could carry, as well as boasts superior terminal-phase kinematic performance), upgraded AASM smart bombs which can be guided via in-built infrared seekers (in addition to the inertial and GPS guidance the legacy versions had), and the Talios laser description pod; whereas the F3 could not. It also sports improved avionics, upgraded software, enhanced flight controls and other enhancements that give it a significant edge over the F3 standard Rafale. These enhancements were so important, that the French government budgeted €1 billion for the research and expansion that went into them in 2014.
It was also reported earlier that the India Air Force's Rafale's would not be controlled to the F3-R standard. The agreement makes the stipulation for further improvement that is slated to be implemented under the F4 standard to be transferred to the Indian fleet as well.
Claim 3:
"Big increase in Rafale's price came since a deal bypassing mandate procedures and made in the face of official objections"
Not a single example of an arm of the government "bypassing mandated procedures" has been obtainable in the report. The author has portrayed a majority decision by the Indian Negotiating Team (INT) in the face of objections by an alternative of the team's members as a violation of procedures, and strategy, but this is not true. As the Ministry of Defence states in its reply, the views and objections of individual committee members are always recorded, and committees vote on the final decision. Far from being a violation of procedure, this is collective decision-making, done in the best traditions of a democratic set-up.
Claim 4:
"Mr. Parrikar shied away from his accountability and . . . passed the buck, to the Cabinet Committee on Security"
The succession of the final agreement—from the INT's approval to the DAC's review to the CCS's—approval is what we call "following the process", as outlined in the 2013 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The Defence Minister did not "pass the buck". Had he determined to unilaterally supersede any committee's (which he was empowered to do, but chose not to) it would have been seen as improper and only encouraged further allegation of bad behavior and dictatorial decision making.
Claim 5:
"The opportunity to make full use of the influence provided by the new offer from the Eurofighter Consortium was lost."
The DPP makes no stipulation for "leveraging" one bid against the other, and could very easily be interpreted as keeping out it. Equipment is to be purchased either by soliciting spirited bids from multiple vendors, or directly from friendly foreign countries via an Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA). The latter route was chosen for the Rafale deal considering the Air Force's urgent needs. There was no path to leveraging an offer from Eurofighter (a vendor) against one from the government of a friendly nation (France).
